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AN OUTSIDER'S VIEW OF 
COMMON LAW EVIDENCE 
Roger C. Park* 
EvrnENCE LAw ADRIFT. By Mirjan R. Damaska. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 1997. Pp. x, 158. $27.50. 
If the discovery of truth be the end of the rules of evidence, and if sa­
gacity consist in the adaptation of means to ends, it appeared to me 
that, in the line of judicature, the sagacity displayed by the sages of law 
was as much below the level of that displayed by an illiterate peasant or 
mechanic in the bosom of his family, as, in the line of physical science, 
the sagacity displayed by the peasant is to the sagacity displayed in the 
same line by a Newton.1 
There have been improvements since Bentham's jeremiad. But 
Anglo-American evidence law is still puzzling. It rejects the 
common-sense principle of free proof in favor of a grotesque jum­
ble of technicalities. It has the breathtaking aspiration of regulating 
inference by rule, causing it to exalt the foresight of remote 
rulemakers over the wisdom of on-the-spot adjudicators. It departs 
from tried-and-true practices of rational inquiry, as when it prohib­
its courts from using categories of evidence that are freely used 
both in everyday life and in the highest affairs of state. Sometimes 
it seems to fear dim light more than deep darkness, as when it tells 
judges to exclude hearsay even though the declarant cannot possi­
bly give live testimony. At times it treats jurors as fools or bigots; at 
others it venerates them as sages. To top it all, evidence law's great­
est scholars have been among its strongest debunkers. 
The institutional context in which evidence law operates partly 
explains and partly justifies its approach to factfinding, as scholars 
and judges have recognized. Many of them subscribe to Thayer's 
view that evidence law is the "child of the jury system,"2 and that 
exclusionary rules are needed to protect the jury against cognitive 
shortcomings. Others have thought of evidence law mainly as the 
child of the adversary system, viewing exclusionary rules as an at­
tempt to achieve adversarial fairness - a game with even chances 
* James Edgar Hervey Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law, University of 
California. A.B. 1964, J.D. 1969, Harvard. - Ed. I am grateful to my colleagues Richard S. 
Frase and Gordon Van Kessel for helpful comments, and to Lynn Dean, Jim Day, and Shalini 
Kedia for useful research assistance. 
1. 1 JEREMY BENTiiAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 5-6 (John S. Mill ed., 1827). 
2. JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 266 (1898); cf. Charles T. 
McCormick, Law and the Future: Evidence, 51 Nw. U. L. RE.v. 218, 224-25 (1956). 
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- or to overcome or prevent adversarial distortions of truth.3 Still 
others have explained its peculiarities as stemming from a desire to 
purify courts of perjury and fabrication,4 or as an attempt to 
achieve public acceptance of verdicts whatever their accuracy.5 Of 
course, these theories can be combined.6 
Mirjan Damaska's Evidence Law Adrift7 is a major addition to 
the literature of explanation and critique. Damaska brings an out­
sider's view - the perspective of one trained in Continental law -
to the question why Anglo-American factfinding is "so peculiar" (p. 
2). He applies an "analytical and interpretive" approach, one that 
mainly attempts to identify current justifications rather than histori­
cal causes (p. 3). In doing so, he separates Anglo-American institu­
tions that evolved as a single organism - such as the bifurcated 
judge-jury system - into distinct elements. He then examines each 
element, testing the current support that it gives to the edifice of 
evidence law. Damaska's adroitness at isolating procedural fea­
tures for separate analysis and at contrasting them with their Conti­
nental counterparts helps common law scholars see their system in 
a new light. He has written a book that every evidence scholar 
should read, and that will be helpful to anyone interested in trials 
and court procedure. 
I. THE THREE PILLARS 
Damaska identifies three pillars of the common law of evidence: 
the bifurcated judge-jury system, the temporal concentration of 
proceedings, and the party-dominant adversary system. These 
three features, present in a much stronger and more pervasive form 
in Anglo-American systems than in Continental systems, are the 
necessary support for many of the common law rules of evidence. 
They are especially useful in explaining the otherwise puzzling in­
trinsic rules (like the hearsay rule) that purportedly protect the 
factfinder against misdecision. Damaska concludes that the Ameri­
can law of evidence is eroding because these pillars are crumbling. 
3. See, e.g., Edmund M. Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence, 
4 U. Cm. L. RE.v. 247 (1937); Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 low AL. RE.v. 
227 (1988); cf. John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View 
from the Ryder Sources, 96 CoLUM. L. RE.v. 1168 (1996). 
4. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Worst Evidence Principle: The Best Hypothesis as to 
the Logical Stmcture of Evidence Law, 46 U. MIAMI L. RE.v. 1069 (1992). 
5. See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the 
Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. RE.v. 1357, 1392 (1985). For a rebuttal, see Ronald J. 
Allen, Rationality, Mythology, and the "Acceptability of Verdicts" Thesis, 66 B.U. L. RE.v. 541 
(1986). 
6. See, e.g., RUPERT CROSS & CoLIN TAPPER, CROSS ON EVIDENCE 1 (6th ed. 1985) 
(combining adversarial and jury-trial rationales). 
7. Mirjan Dama5ka is Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
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He agrees with the widespread view that jury trial is important, 
but parts with convention in his analysis of the source of its impor­
tance (pp. 26-57). He dissects jury trial in a way that invites us to 
see the centrality of features that are often neglected or taken for 
granted. He points out that the participation of lay factfinders is 
not, in itself, an explanation for evidence rules (pp. 30-33). Ama­
teurs would use heuristics and strategies from ordinary life, not 
rules of evidence. Even the infusion of professional judges would 
not create a need for rules of evidence, so long as judges and jurors 
deliberated together, as in Continental environments in which lay 
factfinders work with professionals (pp. 26-29). 
Damaska gives little credit to the argument that jurors need to 
be protected from their own cognitive shortcomings (pp. 29-33). 
Though this concern helps explain the origin of evidence rules, in 
order to justify them one must also show that the excluded classes 
of information have a greater potential to skew lay than profes­
sional judgment. There is no reason to believe jurors are less able 
than judges to assess the weight of hearsay, or are more vulnerable 
to the temptation of propensity inferences. Even for statistical and 
scientific evidence, the average trial judge may be as baffled by 
complexity as the average trial juror. At any rate, it is inconsistent 
to claim that jurors have cognitive shortcomings and at the same 
time expect them to follow complicated limiting instructions. 
Damaska's debunking of this rationale of evidence law is often 
persuasive, but occasionally he seems to yield to a debater's temp­
tation to push a point too hard. True, there is little reason to think 
that judges are better equipped to handle hearsay or character evi­
dence than jurors. But to say that judges will be as baffled as jurors 
by novel scientific evidence seems to deny the value of general edu­
cation. 8 At any rate, judges do believe that they know more than 
jurors. Their conduct is undeniably influenced by the fact that ju­
rors are neither lawyers nor experts. Were the other half of the 
split tribunal a scientific panel or a fellow judge, the evidence 
screener would be much less likely to create barriers. As might be 
expected from an author convinced of the importance of neglected 
features, Damaska's nod to more pedestrian explanations is a some­
what grudging one (pp. 30-31, 128). 
Having minimized the most obvious evidence-related feature of 
jury trial, Damaska turns to other aspects that might escape notice 
when thinking about reasons for evidence law. Consider the 
cryptic, unexplained verdict, which is anathema on the Continent 
8. Nor does use of limiting instructions necessarily show that judges have an inconsistent 
attitude toward jurors. The fact that judges give jurors complicated limiting instructions does 
not necessarily imply that they think them to be geniuses; limiting instructions could simply 
be the least of the evils, better than excluding the evidence and better than saying nothing. 
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but a nearly unavoidable feature of the Anglo-American jury trial. 
It is not practical to ask lay jurors to write findings that justify their 
decisions, but because of the absence of such findings, jury verdicts 
suffer from a legitimacy deficit. The common law handles this defi­
cit by allowing challenges to the evidentiary database. On the Con­
tinent, there is less concern about the purity of the evidentiary input 
because legitimacy is maintained by giving written reasons for ver­
dicts. The law's yearning to legitimize inscrutable jury verdicts may 
be "the single most neglected contribution of the jury to the ration­
ale for evidentiary arrangements peculiar to the Anglo-American 
procedural tradition" (p. 46). 
But bifurcation itself has the most profound influence (pp. 46-
53). The splitting of the trial court into two bodies creates a seed­
bed for rules excluding evidence. In a unitary tribunal, exclusion is 
less practical. It is especially hard for a unitary court to enforce 
rules of exclusion that aim at guarding against the trier's weak­
nesses. The judges of a unitary court would have to exclude on 
grounds that they themselves might be prejudiced. Moreover, ex­
cluding is not the same thing as forgetting. For these reasons, bifur­
cation provides "the institutional black velvet on which the jewels 
of the common law's exclusionary doctrine can display their full po­
tential and allure" (p. 52). Correspondingly, the lack of bifurcation 
on the Continent, even in cases in which lay people participate in 
factfinding, helps explain the absence of exclusionary rules. 
After discussing the jury trial, Damaska turns to his second pil­
iar, one that may not even occur to one schooled only in the com­
mon law system - the concentrated day-in-court trial (pp. 58-73). 
The English tradition of the concentrated trial, with parties bringing 
evidence that had not previously been scrutinized to court, created 
a need for evidence rules that would not otherwise have existed 
(pp. 68-70). Evidentiary practices appropriate in concentrated trials 
in which raw evidence is dumped on the table are not needed for 
episodic trials. Elaborate, during-trial authentication formalities 
are not needed if there is an opportunity to check authenticity be­
forehand. A ban on hearsay is harder to defend if the opponent has 
the opportunity to seek out the declarant for testimony in court, or 
to seek out information about him if the declarant is not available. 
Rules designed to prevent surprise or to abbreviate proceedings are 
less necessary. The gap between the Anglo-American concentrated 
trial and the episodic Continental trial is narrowing, and hence one 
of the pillars of common law evidence is deteriorating (pp. 58-73, 
129). 
Damaska's final pillar (a giant in an unequal group) is the ad­
versary system, defined as "a system of adjudication in which proce­
dural action is controlled by the parties and the adjudicator remains 
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essentially passive [and in which] litigants and their counsel decide 
what facts shall be subject to proof" (p. 74). The parties investigate 
the facts, organize them, and present them to the tribunal. Lawyers 
coach witnesses, and they select experts tendentiously. Though the 
vouching doctrine has been repudiated, participants still find it hard 
to separate sources of proof from the party offering the proof (p. 
76). Judges rarely call their own witnesses, and the system is un­
comfortable with the turncoat witness. It is often unclear, for ex­
ample, who is entitled to cross-examine a witness who wavers 
between sides. 
In contrast, on the Continent, evidence is assembled by judges 
and other officials (p. 77). Damaska reports that though contacts 
between counsel and witnesses are increasing, they are still disfa­
vored; if revealed, lawyer contact diminishes the witness's credibil­
ity (p. 77). Expert witnesses are appointed by the court as assistants 
to the judge rather than as true witnesses; in fact, they are allowed 
to pose questions to ordinary witnesses. The fission of evidence 
presentation into plaintiff's and defendant's cases is unknown or 
nearly so (p. 78). 
Damaska agrees with those who believe that the adversary sys­
tem helps explain the disapproval of hearsay (pp. 79-80). The asso­
ciation of evidence with parties makes hearsay problematic. With 
bipolarization comes increased concern about fabrication. Its sup­
posed cure, cross-examination, is "enveloped with clouds of eulogy, 
almost apotheosized" (p. 79). It is easy to see an out-of-court de­
clarant as the confederate of an enemy, unfairly kept from view and 
insulated from the test of cross-examination. Moreover, the prac­
tice is more important in a system in which a well-done cross­
examination can diminish the credibility of almost any testimony. 
Thus, "the common law's hostility toward hearsay is not predicated 
on purely epistemic concerns: it also springs from principles of fair­
ness that are applicable to a competitive fact-finding scheme" (p. 
80). When the common lawyer's solicitude for adversarial fairness 
does not stand in the way (for example, when the evidence is the 
admission of a party), then hearsay is more freely received. 
Damaska reports that, on the Continent, challenges to the accu­
racy of witness testimony are focused and subdued, seldom escalat­
ing into a broad attack on veracity. When hearsay is received, 
lawyers are less likely to feel that they have been cheated or that an 
enemy has unfairly been kept offstage and untested (p. 81). 
In addition, there is a difference in the degree to which hearsay 
is dangerous to truthfinding. In the adversary system, hearsay is 
more dangerous because party competition does not always pro­
duce the best evidence. For example, a party might prefer to 
present hearsay in lieu of original testimony because the witness 
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who would testify to the hearsay evidence has a more persuasive 
demeanor, a higher social status, or a better sense of theater than 
the out-of-court declarant. A rule excluding hearsay provides that 
party with an incentive to find and call the original declarant (p. 
85). 
In an adversarial system, limits on heterodox expert testimony 
are more necessary because parties would otherwise present ques­
tionable experts for partisan advantage. Moreover, the rejection of 
otherwise probative evidence can actually help to protect truthfind­
ing if exclusion prevents adversarial misconduct. For example, an 
exclusion for violation of a rule requiring pretrial disclosure of evi­
dence may encourage fair disclosure in future cases. In addition, 
rules excluding evidence are more likely to be invoked by the par­
ties under an adversarial system because an objection is a complaint 
about the behavior of the opponent, not about the behavior of the 
body that will eventually make the decision on the merits (p. 86). 
The adversarial system also enhances party control over the ap­
plication of evidence rules (pp. 87-88). Sometimes a party has the 
option of opening or closing a door to an opponent's evidence by 
offering or forgoing evidence of its own. Parties can stipulate to 
variations in evidence rules, or let them be modified by failing to 
object to an opponent's evidence. Damaska observes that features 
of party control that lawyers in Anglo-American systems take for 
granted seem amazing to outsiders. Parties can stipulate, for exam­
ple, that a polygraph test is admissible, even when the test would 
otherwise be deemed insufficiently trustworthy. Because parties 
control objections to evidence, the Anglo-American system is occa­
sionally more receptive to hearsay than the Continental system. On 
the Continent, in jurisdictions that prefer the use of original over 
hearsay proof, even if the parties are content with hearsay, a judge 
may require original proof. Ironically, then, Continental law is oc­
casionally more strict in barring hearsay than the common law. 
Damaska considers the extent to which Anglo-American parties 
are permitted to agree to variances in rules of evidence to suit 
themselves in particular cases to be a "striking - though un­
remarked - idiosyncrasy of the common law fact-finding style" (p. 
88). 
In his discussion of the adversary system, Damaska reflects on 
the effectiveness of the system for truthfinding (pp. 88-103), and on 
what its uncertain regard for truth shows about the purposes of liti­
gation (pp. 111-24). Readers may recognize echoes of his work in 
the 1970s and 1980s in this portion of the book.9 With his usual 
elegance, he compares the Anglo-American adversary system to 
9. See MnuAN DAMA!lKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY (1986); Mirjan 
Damaska, Adversary System, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 24 (Sanford 
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Continental systems - or perhaps it would be more accurate to say 
that he compares models or conceptually purified paradigms. 
While he draws back from a firm conclusion, it is clear that he is 
skeptical about claims that the adversary system promotes 
truth:finding, and finds its departure from ordinary means of ra­
tional inquiry disturbing (pp. 92-103). The fission into two distinct 
cases cuts out investigation of other possibilities: "[A]s in a car 
driving at night, two narrow beams continue to illuminate the world 
presented to the adjudicator from the beginning until the end of 
trial" (p. 92). The sequence of your-case/my-case, one-story-at-a­
time is artificial. Narratives are disrupted by technical objections 
and sidebars and by the question-and-answer method itself. 
Although passivity has some virtues, active inquiry is a better and 
more natural way to learn (pp. 96-97). 
Damaska finds particularly troubling the role of biased, self­
interested partisans in developing evidence (pp. 98-102). Partisan 
interviews can plant false memories. Information sources may be 
polluted in ways that cross-examination cannot cure. Witnesses, be­
cause they are aligned with a party, begin to feel like members of a 
team. They are coached by parties and, in the case of experts, paid 
by them. Parties present evidence selectively. They want only wit­
nesses who will help them and only want part of what the witnesses 
know. Information that does not clearly help one or the other is 
filtered out. Moreover, the idea that hearing two partisan accounts 
helps the trier discover the truth only works where the contestants 
have equal resources, a condition not often met. 
Though Damaska disclaims any final conclusion about which 
system produces better results, he would find it "unsurprising" if 
"some version of the officially dominated fact-finding model is 
found to be better suited for truth-discovery" (pp. 102-03). He 
doubts that even common law trial lawyers feel that the adversary 
system is best for discovering truth. The common law's embrace of 
the adversary system shows how highly the common law values dis­
pute resolution as the goal of all procedure. Even the criminal pro­
cess is seen as an exercise in the settlement of disputes.10 This 
ubiquitous dispute-resolving mission 
erects the considerations of disputational fairness - such as the bal­
ancing of advantages between the litigants - to the status of values 
capable of interfering with the search for the truth. And it is the pri­
macy of the conflict-resolving vision that explains why the competitive 
fact-finding system appears acceptable - or even desirable - in 
Kadish ed., 1983); Mirjan Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 
U. PA. L. REv. 1083 {1975). 
10. He reports that on the Continent, civil suits are seen as devoted to resolution of dis­
putes, but criminal trials are venues for the realization of state policy about crime. Pp. 113-
20. 
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Anglo-American countries, despite the departures it entails from or­
dinary fact-finding practices. [p. 124] 
In this excursus, Damaska seems temporarily insensitive to pos­
sible virtues of the common law system. The common law's ro­
mance with the adversary system may be based not only on a 
dispute-resolution mentality, but also on a belief that it is a brake 
on abuse of power.11 A nonadversarial, active-judge system has ob­
vious advantages if one can take for granted that the legal environ­
ment will come equipped with judges who are unbiased, hard­
working, delicate with the liberties of others, incorruptible, and im­
pervious to the wishes of influential friends. If one doubts those 
assumptions, then the common law system could seem superior 
even to those who value accurate verdicts. Damaska's analytical 
method - disentangling the elements of the common law system 
and viewing them separately - has many advantages, but it can 
also obscure the synergy of some of the elements. The jury system 
(a bifurcated court with lay factfinders chosen randomly for the oc­
casion) works together with the adversary system in limiting the 
power of officials; the strong role of the parties prevents the judges 
from sabotaging the safeguard of ad hoc, amateur factfinding.12 If 
citizens of common law countries see the combination as a safe­
guard against oppression or corruption13 - whether they are right 
or wrong - then Damaska's thesis that love of the adversary sys­
tem reveals a preference for settlement above truth may need 
qualification. 
II. CRACKS IN THE PILLARS 
Having identified the three pillars, Damaska chronicles their de­
cline (pp. 125-42). Several common law jurisdictions have virtually 
eliminated the jury system (pp. 126-29). Even in its ultimate citadel 
- criminal cases in the United States - its importance is declining 
(p. 127). Jury trials are only a small proportion of the total cases in 
the system. Their main function is to serve as a bargaining chip in 
plea negotiations, because the defense can hold out the threat of 
going to trial. With the decline of the jury trial, skills of lawyers will 
atrophy, and the law of evidence will lose an argumentative justifi­
cation. It will be harder to present evidence law as a necessary 
11. In Adrift, DamaSka makes only a passing reference to "the classical liberal impulse to 
keep the state at arm's length." P. 118. Elsewhere he has explored the link between the 
adversary system and an ideology that fears state power. See Mirjan DamaSka, Structures of 
Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE L.J. 480, 532-39 (1975). 
12. In our grand jury proceedings we see an example of lay adjudication in the absence of 
adversarial protections, and with rare exceptions the grand jurors are under the control of the 
public official who presents evidence and guidance to them. 
13. For a classic statement of this view, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 
(1968). 
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prophylactic against the foibles of lay reasoning (p. 128). There will 
be less need to compensate for the unexplained nature of jury ver­
dicts. Most importantly, without bifurcation it will simply be harder 
to enforce rules of evidence because the trier of fact will also rule 
on admissibility. Damaska concludes that the oldest pillar is "more 
ornamental than functional" (p. 129). 
Here I will pause for a caveat. I believe that Damaska is correct 
in saying that the functional end of jury trial would profoundly 
change the law of evidence. But for the American system, one may 
question his empirical conclusion. It is true that, compared to the 
total number of cases filed, the proportion of jury trials - or any 
trials - has decreased compared to cases settled or plea bar­
gained.14 That suggests a waning of influence, though one must re­
member that the jury throws a long shadow over everything else.1s 
Considered as a percentage of cases tried, however, the jury seems 
to be holding its own. Federal jury trials have been a fairly constant 
proportion of all trials in the last three decades, in criminal cases 
comprising a majority of all trials.16 The jury trial also seems to be 
holding on in state courts. Approximately eighty percent of tort 
claims and sixty percent of criminal cases that go to trial in state 
court are tried to a jury, and there are twice as many jury trials as 
14. The percentage of federal criminal cases filed that went to trial was 14.9% in 1982, see 
.ANNuAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS 
in 1982 REPs. OF THE PRoc. OF THE JUD. CoNF. OF THE U.S. 310; it declined to 8.3% in 1996, 
see JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 1996 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, in 
1996 REPS. OF THE PRoc. oF THE Juo. CoNF. OF THE U.S. 221 tbl.D-4 [hereinafter 1996 
REPORT]. For a longer view, see Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of 
the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. Cm. L. REv. 867, 921-28 (1994) (describing and 
condemning the transition from trial to bargained pleas in the American criminal justice 
system since the 18th century). 
15. For an interesting account of the strong role that civil jury verdicts still play in a 
system geared to settlement, see Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury 
Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1996). 
16. Damaska says that "[o]f those cases that are not disposed by bargained guilty pleas, 
an increasing portion is decided by judges sitting alone." P. 127 (citing Stephen Schulhofer, 
ls Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1037 (1984)). Since the publication of 
Professor Schulhofer's article in 1984, however, jury trials have held their own as a propor­
tion of total trials, at least in the federal courts. In 1984 federal jury trials were 43.1 % of all 
trials (56.3% of criminal trials); in 1996, the most recent year for which information is avail­
able, the figures are 48.3 % of all trials and 56.6% of criminal trials. ANNUAL REPORT OF TI-IE 
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, in 1984 REPS. OF TI-IE 
PROC. OF THE JUD. CoNF. OF THE U.S. 298-301 tbl.C-7; 1996 REPORT, supra note 14, at 171 
tbl.C-7. 
To take a more distant benchmark: In his well-known 1970 article on the declining need 
for evidence rules in bench trials, Kenneth Culp Davis wrote that "[d]istrict courts in [1968] 
completed 14,221 trials in civil and criminal cases, of which 7,278 were nonjury and 6,943 
were jury trials." Kenneth Culp Davis, Hearsay in Nonjury Cases, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1362, 
1363 (1970). For 1996, the most recent year for which data is available, the sentence would 
read: "District courts completed 17,545 civil and criminal trials, of which 9,068 were nonjury 
and 8,477 were jury trials." The absolute number of jury trials has increased since Davis 
wrote, and the proportion has decreased only slightly (48.9% in 1968, 48.3% in 1996). See 
1996 REPORT, supra, at 171 tbl.C-7. 
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bench trials.17 Though jury trial seems anachronistic in certain 
types of cases, it will die slowly if at all. It has the protection of its 
constitutional status,18 of the public's love of its drama, and of its 
continuing value in lending legitimacy to resolutions of otherwise 
ineffable credibility con:flicts.19 
Turning to the second pillar, temporal compression, Damaska 
postulates severe decay on account of extensive pretrial proceed­
ings and discovery (p. 129). Such pretrial practices make it less im­
portant to check the authenticity of evidence (p. 130). Yet he 
recognizes that pretrial discovery is used adversarially, and that 
such phenomena as overproduction and concealment leave a 
residual need for checking and filtering. Moreover, criminal discov­
ery remains primitive in many jurisdictions. His second pillar seems 
far less important than the others, both because it has less impact 
even when ideal archetypes are fully contrasted, and because the 
dimension and nature of the changes in it do not remove the need 
for evidentiary barriers. Litigation is more spread out, but safe­
guards are still needed so long as pretrial activity is adversarial. 
Nevertheless, the expanded opportunity for notice before trial and 
the practice of some courts in disposing of technical objections 
before trial has had an impact on authentication rules and provides 
opportunities for notice-based reform of rules such as the hearsay 
rule. 
Damaska believes that the third pillar - the adversary system 
- is also cracking (pp. 135-42). He concedes that it still has strong 
support, and that some features of contemporary litigation -
docket pressure, for example - actually shore up the common 
law's dispute-resolution mentality and its proclivity to delegate evi­
dence development to parties. But there is at least a potential for 
reducing the role of parties. To begin with, he asks the reader to 
consider how subtle changes in the lawyer-judge relationship in 
bench trials weaken the adversarial climate. First, there is more in­
teraction between trier and advocate. Judges, unlike jurors, can 
communicate with lawyers during trial. When judges become di­
rectly accountable for accurate factfinding, their sense of personal 
responsibility causes them to intervene more actively than they 
17. See Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence Law in the Next Millennium, 49 HASTINGS LJ. 
{forthcoming 1998) (citing BRIAN J. OSTROM & NEAL B. KAUDER, EXAMINING THE WoRK 
OF STATE CoURTS, 1995: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 
30 (National Center for State Courts ed., 1996); BUREAU OF JusTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. 
OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 1992, at 10 tbl.10 {1995)). 
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI, VII. The Seventh Amendment protects the right to jury' 
trial in federal civil cases, while the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right in federal and 
state criminal cases. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-56 (1968). 
19. See George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 705-07 (1997). 
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would when supervising jury trials.20 Lawyer-against-lawyer argu­
ments are supplemented with arguments between the lawyers and 
the increasingly active judge. Second, contests over evidentiary ob­
jections become more tame. Lawyers know that the ultimate trier 
will learn the substance of the evidence whether or not an objection 
is sustained; in fact, attempts to keep out valuable evidence can 
themselves annoy the judge. Moreover, pointless struggles over un­
important evidence are less likely to occur in judge-only trials, be­
cause exchanges between the judge and the lawyers make it easier 
for lawyers to surmise what matters to the trier of fact. Overall, 
when the roles of factfinding and of evidence-screening are united, 
the judge's power is increased and that of the parties diminished, 
and the adversarial climate becomes more subdued. 
Damaska also postulates that increasing state activism will influ­
ence the procedural framework (pp. 136-38). The strong role of the 
parties in a common law trial is associated with the laissez-faire 
state and its minimalist goals. With the rise of an activist state, with 
its social policies and programs, litigation would be used to imple­
ment state policy rather than merely to settle disputes. 
When government has an activist agenda, even bilateral ar­
rangements are seen as affecting social policy. Virtually all private 
contracts can be significant in terms of some government policy, 
such as protecting the environment, preventing abuse of market 
power, or encouraging fair employment practices (p. 137). A firing 
can be an act of discrimination or sexual harassment. "Adjudica­
tion itself may tum into a governmental program [that] calls for a 
strategic vision reaching beyond the particular case before the 
court" (p. 137). Where externalities such as an impact on the envi­
ronment are of concern, the court is less likely to want to be a pas­
sive umpire and more likely to want to develop its own facts. Also, 
where implementation of state policy is the goal, courts are less 
willing to treat two clashing possibilities defined by the parties as 
the full range of reality (pp. 136-37). 
Here the reader may recognize echoes of Damaska's The Faces 
of Justice and State Authority21 and may wonder whether the pros­
pects for an expanding activist state in the United States are as firm 
now as they were when that work was written. Damaska concedes 
that pressure from this source may be temporarily dormant, and 
recognizes that there are signs in many countries of transfer of au­
thority away from the central state, a development that he charac­
terizes as a "neomedieval movement" (p. 139 n.27). But he believes 
20. P. 135. For observations, partly based on the Diplock trials, that reinforce this point, 
see Sean Doran et al., Rethinking Adversariness in Nonjury Criminal Trials, 23 AM. J. CRIM. 
L. 1, 26-30 {1995). 
21. MIRJ.Al'l DAMA�KA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 231-39 {1986). 
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that increased state involvement is inevitable anyway. Technologi­
cal advances mean that events such as ecological disasters are more 
likely to affect large numbers of people. Strong economic pressures 
exist for collective lawsuits. In multiparty cases, plaintiff-against­
plaintiff and defendant-against-defendant disputes will undermine 
the bipolar paradigm (p. 140). The growing complexity of factual 
issues about markets or hazards "resists being fitted into the corset 
of two partisan evidentiary cases" (p. 140). Investigative services of 
government agencies are needed and there is an inclination to use 
the results at trial.22 
Damaska believes that these influences may weaken the adver­
sary system, but he recognizes that this third pillar is still fairly ro­
bust (p. 141). The system has habit and tradition behind it, and in 
the United States it has a measure of constitutional protection. 
These forces are bolstered by the needs of judges with clogged 
dockets who welcome private procedural enterprise as a means of 
reducing the number of trials. The goal of dispute resolution thus 
remains important, perhaps still dominating the goal of accurate 
policy implementation. Because a damn-the-facts, end-the-fight 
mentality supports greater party control, the adversary system is 
likely to be with us for a while longer.23 
Despite the qualifications he noted along the way, Damaska 
ends the heart of his book - his three pillars analysis - with a 
fairly strong conclusion: that "[w]ith jury trials marginalized, proce­
dural concentration abandoned, and the adversary system some­
what weakened, the institutional environment appears to have 
decayed that supplied distinctive features of common law evidence 
with a strong argumentative rationale" (p. 142). Therefore, the 
rules of evidence "face the danger of becoming antiquated period 
pieces, intellectual curiosa confined to an oubliette in the castle of 
justice" (p. 142). 
III. THE WHIRLWIND 
In his Epilogue, Damaska looks at another change - the 
"creeping scientization of factual inquiry" (p. 143) - and assesses 
its impact on evidence law and on the three pillars thesis (pp. 143-
52). He notes that testimony derived immediately from sensory 
perception has declined in importance, to be supplanted by expert 
testimony, including testimony about the results of scientific testing. 
22. P. 140. For example, agency reports are admitted under the public records exception 
to the hearsay rule as expansively interpreted by the Supreme Court. P. 140 n.29. 
23. Pp. 141-42. The rise of "managerial judging" in the civil context suggests a possibility 
that does not sit comfortably with Damaska's linkage of party dominance to a dispute resolu­
tion mentality - viz., the bossy, initiative-taking, inquisitorial judge whose goal is not policy 
implementation but dispute resolution. Of course, the managerial judge usually does not get 
involved until after considerable party activity. 
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The trial system must more and more deal with information that 
only experts can understand easily. 
The "scientization of proof" (p. 145) puts additional strain on 
the three pillars. The lay jury's understanding is challenged. It has 
a harder time with scientific evidence than would an expert panel or 
even a judge, who at least has the opportunity to acquire familiarity 
through repetition. The use of experts makes it harder to have a 
continuous proceeding that leads without interruption to a defini­
tive climax. Complex information is hard to assimilate in day-in­
court proceedings; a sequence with intervals would make more 
sense. And the party-dominant adversary system is not a good way 
of dealing with scientific information. Parties will be selective, 
looking only for favorable information. Cues and strategies used in 
ordinary life can lead the trier astray. Parties with weak cases may 
find the most credible-looking experts. And jurors cannot test con­
flicting scientific testimony by assessing how it fits with the rest of a 
party's story. Establishing truth by examining consistency is diffi­
cult because scientific evidence rarely fits into story-like narratives 
(p. 146). 
Moreover, the fission into two cases "bedevils" the presentation 
of scientific data (p. 146). Experts on different sides usually cannot 
be examined "back to back" (p. 146). And the use of oral testi­
mony presented in response to questions may actually be inferior to 
the study of written materials. In short, the common law proce­
dural environment is not well suited for the effective and accurate 
presentation of scientific information. Because the law follows the 
prevailing "epistemological temper" (p. 147), there eventually will 
be legal change to accommodate scientific inquiry. 
Though Damaska believes that only the general direction of 
change can be predicted, he ventures a few suggestions about the 
form that change might take (pp. 147-52). He predicts the growth 
of a diverse menu of trial mechanisms, both unitary and bifurcated. 
The responsibilities of the lay jury will probably be reduced. Blue­
ribbon juries may find acceptance. Judging will more often be dele­
gated to special masters. Proceedings will become more episodic 
and document-driven. Decisionmakers will be allowed to study evi­
dentiary material beforehand. Party control will be less pervasive. 
In the new age, the lawyer-dominated jury trial will no longer be 
seen as the paradigm for which all evidence rules are designed. Ac­
cordingly, there will be less emphasis on evidence screening. Wit­
nesses will gain greater freedom to tell what they know. But 
Damaska doubts that Continental systems will be adopted, because 
of the absence of a civil service judiciary or neutral official investi­
gators. There will be "indigenous remedies" for the illnesses of the 
common law courts (pp. 151-52). 
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Damaska predicts that Continental systems will also have 
problems dealing with experts (pp. 151-52). He indicates that Con­
tinental proceduralists are beginning to worry about the dominance 
of court-appointed experts. Judges, who have difficulty compre­
hending the arcane findings of some experts, may be seen as dele­
gating decision.making powers to an outsider who lacks legitimacy. 
Damaska believes that the tension between the impenetrability of 
science and the adjudicator's postulated freedom to decide using 
ordinary reasoning will cause great changes on the Continent. It 
may mean that one of the main precepts of Continental evidence 
law - the principle of free evaluation of evidence - will need to 
be rethought. 
Damaska believes that all justice systems will face great trans­
formations, changes that could be as momentous as the changeover 
from magical forms of proof at the end of the Middle Ages. And he 
sees some advantages in the common law tradition that might help 
it survive the expected storms with less disruption than Continental 
systems. The common law's bifurcated court has created "habits of 
fragmenting authority" (p. 152). Those habits might facilitate the 
division of decision.making authority between scientific experts and 
others. Even the much-criticized practice of partisan selection of 
experts may lessen the stress of change. Because the common law 
is accustomed to resolving battles of experts, its judges may not 
yield so blindly to the authority of science as would judges who use 
their own chosen experts. At any rate, "the cracking pillars of com­
mon law evidence" will be repaired or replaced "by domestic ma­
sons and by indigenous building material" (p. 152). 
I have summarized Damaska's main themes. Bur of course all 
summaries select and omit. The reader of the full book will find 
much more than an elaboration of the points I have sketched. I 
have concentrated on the Anglo-American system, passing over 
many of his interesting and useful observations about Continental 
law. Where I have noted features of Continental law, I have some­
times omitted Damaska's qualifications; he recognizes that systems 
are mixed and that features of adversarial practice appear on the 
Continent. Moreover, I excluded as subsidiary some of Damaska's 
most original and intriguing points. One example is his discussion 
of how bifurcation cuts so deeply that it even influences the concept 
of relevancy - causing common law thinkers to make what would 
otherwise be a highly artificial distinction between the credibility of 
the source of evidence and the probative value of evidence if credi­
bility is assumed (pp. 56-57). 
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IV. A READER'S CRITIQUE 
I think that Damaska is mainly right about the pillars of com­
mon law evidence. The jury system is obviously important, and its 
decay would have strong consequences. Similarly, many of our evi­
dence rules would make no sense in a nonadversarial system -
although as he recognizes, the adversary system is likely to be with 
us for a long time to come.24 The Anglo-American concentration 
of proceedings - the most slender of Damaska's three pillars -
probably also has some effect. Finally, science, the approaching 
whirlwind discussed in his Epilogue, will shake the three pillars, 
changing evidence law in the course of changing everything else. 
Even if Damaska is mainly right, evidence teachers need not 
fear that they will lose their jobs. Damaska's thesis applies mainly 
to intrinsic rules of exclusion, those that seek to prevent misdeci­
sion by the trier of fact. Changes in the three pillars will have less 
effect on extrinsic exclusionary rules that pursue other goals. The 
rules of privilege, which sometimes sweep more broadly on the 
Continent than in the United States (pp. 12-13), are one example. 
They are enforceable even in a unitary tribunal. Unless the party 
seeking to pierce the privilege lays an affirmative foundation for 
doing so, not even the evidence screener learns the privileged infor­
mation.25 They are not founded on ideas of jury incompetence or 
dependent on concentrated proceedings. Nor do they thrive only in 
the adversary system __:_ although, as Damaska points out, the in­
volvement of lawyers with witnesses may in some situations make 
the invocation of privilege more likely (p. 13 n.16). Rules based on 
extrinsic policies have continued to flourish in America, most re­
cently with the recognition of the therapist-patient privilege,26 the 
expansion of the remedial measures rule,27 and the enhanced pro­
tection given rape complainants against revelation of sexual 
history.28 
The shape of the intrinsic exclusionary rules, such as the rules 
against hearsay and character evidence, will undoubtedly be af­
fected by the forces that Damaska identifies. But as is always the 
24. For an adept account that leaves one thinking that the adversary system is perhaps 
too much alive in contemporary American criminal process, see Gordon Van Kessel, 
Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 403, 431-32 
(1992). 
25. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 570-72 (1989). 
26. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996). 
27. See FED. R. Evm. 407 (as amended Dec. 1, 1997). The new rule makes it clear that 
the exclusionary provision applies in strict liability cases as well as negligence cases. 
28. See FED. R. Evm. 412 (the "rape shield" rule). Though the rule is partly based on the 
concept that juries may be prejudiced by the evidence - an intrinsic exclusionary principle 
- it also draws strong support from its goals of encouraging witnesses to report and of pro­
tecting them from unnecessary humiliation. See David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other 
Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REv. 529, 568 (1994). 
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case with authors who present strong themes and a memorable 
message, Damaska does not cover everything. Other hypotheses 
about what will change the law of evidence are also attractive. 
Damaska rationalizes procedural rules by reference to their proce­
dural environment, and makes the benevolent assumption that 
when their rationales definitively fail, the procedural rules will 
wither away (p. 142). He may be right, bu,t along the way substan­
tive influences are also likely to have an important impact. They 
certainly deserve acknowledgment in telling the story of recent 
changes in American evidence law. 
Perhaps recent reforms that have lowered evidentiary barriers 
succeeded because they encountered three crumbling pillars instead 
of a solid edifice, but their immediate genesis was substantive, and 
the effect of the procedural environment was indirect and specula­
tive. Fear of crime and empathy for crime victims have been key 
substantive influences. These influences account for changes in evi­
dence law that have been adopted by popular initiative as victims' 
rights measures - from the California "truth-in-evidence" amend­
ments of the 1980s29 to the recent Oregon initiative calling for all 
relevant evidence to be admissible against criminal defendants.30 
Along with increased concern for women's rights and for female 
victims of crime, these substantive influences also account for the 
recent changes in the character evidence rules that allow prior sex 
offenses of the defendant to be admitted31 and that exclude 
· 
29. CAL. CoNST. art. I,§ 28(d). For an account of the effect of public initiatives on evi­
dence law, see Eleanor Swift, Does it Matter Who is in Charge of Evidence Law?, 25 LoYOLA 
L.A. L. REv. 649 (1992). California's 1982 victinis' rights initiative would (under a generous 
interpretation) have allowed free impeachment of criminal defendants with prior convictions, 
and would have considerably increased the admissibility of character evidence. The meas­
ures were diluted by a combination of restrictive judicial interpretation and legislative re­
trenchment See People v. Ewoldt, 867 P.2d 757 (1994); People v. Ballard, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
624 (App. Div. 1993). 
30. See OR. CONST. art. I, § 42(f). Provisions that give the victim procedural rights -
such as the right to be heard at proceedings in which the defendant might be released from 
custody - suggest a strengthening of the dispute-resolution, victim-satisfaction model rather 
than progress towards Damaska's model of the policy-implementing state. For an account of 
a proposed federal amendment that would give procedural rights to victims in criminal pro­
ceedings, see Robert P. Mosteller, Victims'· Rights and the United States Constitution: An 
Effort to Recast the Battle in Criminal Litigation, 85 GEO. LJ. 1691 (1997) [hereinafter 
Mosteller, Victims' Rights]. 
31. FED. R. Evm. 413-415 were enacted as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 320935, 108 Stat. 1796, 2135-37 ("Crime 
Bill"). Senator Biden, the Senate Judiciary Committee Chair, had opposed Rules 413-415, 
partly on the grounds that they had not been through the Judicial Conference process, and 
the rules were dropped from the version of the Crime Bill that emerged from the House­
Senate Conference committee. Representative Susan Molinari refused to vote for the larger 
Crime Bill without those provisions and succeeded in having them reinstated. See Katharine 
Q. Seelye, Negotiators Work on Details That Could Save Crime Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 
1994, at A9; Jill Zuckman, Negotiators in House Outline Deal on Crime Bill, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Aug. 21, 1994, § 2, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File; see also Clinton 
Finally Gets a Crime Bill, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Aug. 26, 1994, at lA, available in 
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evidence about the sexual history of the complainant.32 There is 
much to be said for these provisions, but it is hard to pretend that 
their political genesis lay in a muted weighing of evidentiary consid­
erations. In some instances, the pure and simple desire to increase 
conviction rates is as strong an explanation. 
The substantive influence of crime fear, which has been so pow­
erful in the recent past, is possibly waning now; even the popular 
media is carrying stories about the decline of crime.33 So the proce­
dural pillars, strong or cracking, may for a time face only a dimin­
ished assault from substantive storms. Even a pig whose house is 
made of straw will have shelter a while longer if no wolf comes to 
blow it away. 
Though Damaska does not specifically address the impact of 
popular perceptions about crime, crime victims, and women as 
crime victims, a belief that these considerations influence evidence 
law is broadly consistent with his framework. Substantive attempts 
to aid victims or dampen crime could be seen as examples of an 
activist state taking a policy-implementing perspective and hence, 
because the focus on dispute resolution has been relaxed, discard­
ing evidence rules rooted in an adversarial dispute-resolution 
mentality. Thus, procedural reformers do not see a rape trial as an 
occasion for adjusting a dispute between the rapist and the victim, 
but as one in which the safety of women and their willingness to 
report rape must be broadly guarded. As another example of the 
triumph of the policy-implementing ideal, one could point to 
LEXIS, News Library, Stribe File. The Crime Bill as enacted contained a proviso that the 
effective date of Rules 413-415 would be delayed to give the Judicial Conference a chance to 
respond to them. During the waiting period, the Judicial Conference issued a report oppos· 
ing Rules 413-415 and recommending no change in existing law; as a second choice, it recom­
mended a flexible approach that would give judges greater power to exclude sex-crime 
evidence. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE ADMISSION OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN 
CERTAIN SEXUAL MiscoNDUCT CASES (1995), reprinted in 56 Crim. L. Rep. (ENA) No. 19, 
at 2140 (Feb. 15, 1995). The American Bar Association House of Delegates also passed a 
resolution opposing Rules 413-415. See Myrna S. Raeder, American Bar Association Crimi­
nal Justice Section Report to the House of Delegates, reprinted in 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 343 
(1995). Congress took no action on these recommendations and the Crime Bill version of 
Rules 413-415 took effect. 
32. See FED. R. Evm. 412. Substantive influences have also played a strong role in the 
dispute over admissibility of expert testimony about battered women's syndrome. See 
Robert P. Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics in Criminal Trials and Evidence Law, 46 DuKE 
L.J. 461 (1996) [hereinafter Mosteller, Syndromes]. 
33. For example, see Major Crimes Drop for 6th Straight Year, Police Report, CHI. TRJn., 
Jan. 19, 1998, § 2, at 3; Rene Sanchez, Nation's Murder Rate at a Low, Other Serious Crimes 
Down, WASH. PoST, Oct. 5, 1997, at A9; NBC Nightly News: Drop in Crime Rates Across 
Country, Including Murder Rates, Attributed Partly to Increased Police Presence (NBC televi­
sion broadcast, Dec. 30, 1997); CBS Morning News: New FBI Figures Show Decline in Crime 
for the Fifth Year in a Row (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 6, 1997). 
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changes in the hearsay rule that aid the prosecution of spousal 
abuse cases though the victim ceases to cooperate.34 
Other changes seem to be aimed at helping victims in ways that 
defy an easy connection to the activist state thesis. In this category 
one might include statutes giving the victim a stronger role in pro­
ceedings, which could be seen as a step away from policy implemen­
tation and back to party satisfaction,35 and rape shield legislation 
that protects the victim from revelation of sexual history in court, 
even in situations in which the evidence might be somewhat 
probative.36 
On the American scene, the future of evidence law will also be 
affected by the increasing politicization of procedural rulemaking. 
Procedural rulemaking will become less and less the province of 
legal experts. Of course, the judges and lawyers will continue to 
play a substantial role, both through traditional case-by-case law­
making, and through expert judge-and-lawyer advisory committees. 
But legislators and lobbyists will become more influential in shap­
ing evidence law. Even in the arcane field of pretrial civil proce­
dure, the once-prevalent model of apolitical rulemaking - under 
which an expert elite, free of partisan pressures, promulgated neu­
tral transubstantive rules - is in steep decline.37 In that context, 
politicization has shown itself in the activities of interest groups 
such as court reporters, psychologists, and of course lawyers, who 
have sought to obtain procedural favors from Congress and from 
the Advisory Committee.38 In the evidence context, politicians and 
their constituents have long been active in the creation of extrinsic 
rules of exclusion. Privileges have been a subject of state legislation 
for some time, and of course interested professional groups have 
had a say in their creation.39 The making of intrinsic rules, by 
34. See, e.g., CAL. Evm. CODE § 1370 (West Supp. 1998) (providing for admissibility of 
hearsay evidence in certain circumstances in which evidence describes infliction or threat of 
physical injury to an unavailable witness). 
35. Cf. Mosteller, Victims' Rights, supra note 30, at 1691. 
36. See FED. R. Evm. 412; Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and 
Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REv. 763, 807, 812-13 (1986). 
37. See Paul D. Carrington, Leaming from the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need Real 
Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295 (1994); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Infor­
mal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795 (1991). 
38. See Mullenix, supra note 37, at 840-57. 
39. For an interesting account of the professional interest in one privilege, see Justice 
Scalia's dissenting opinion in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996) . 
Political involvement in evidence rulemaking went beyond the privilege area, however, 
when, through the joint operation of zeitgeist and bad luck, the Federal Rules of Evidence 
ended up in Congress. Perhaps because the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee over­
reached by setting forth detailed and controversial rules about privilege (including executive 
privilege in the Watergate era), Congress prevented the rules promulgated by the Court in 
1973 from going into effect. See 1 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 6.3 (Tillers Rev. 1983) . It then 
proceeded to debate and change not only extrinsic evidence rules, but also some of the intrin­
sic ones, including the details of hearsay exceptions. Ironically, Congress ultimately decided 
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contrast, has traditionally been viewed as the prerogative of judges. 
One would think that, especially as applied to bench trials, the set­
ting of guidelines for fair inference falls in the core of the judicial 
function. After all, evidence rules deal with the raw materials of 
adjudicative reasoning, the database that may be used for the 
factfinder's conclusions. 40 
But Congress and the state legislators have not left even intrin­
sic rules wholly to judicial rulemaking. The most recent manifesta­
tion of Congress's interest was the proposed amendment to Rule 
702 in the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act41 which was intro­
duced in the House as one of the of the ten bills that made up the 
Republican "Contract With America."42 Part of a tort reform pack­
age, it would have codified Daubert43 in a way aimed at further lim­
iting the admissibility of expert testimony in civil cases.44 On the 
state level, legislative interest in the details of intrinsic rules extends 
from laws dealing with the admissibility of DNA evidence and of 
expert testimony on battered women's syndrome45 to tailored 
to dodge the privilege issues and delegate them back to the older process of case-by-case 
decision. See FED. R. Evm. 501 (instructing courts to use state law and the principles of the 
common law, considered "in the light of reason and experience"). 
40. Hence some state supreme courts have suggested that, as a matter of state constitu­
tional law, the separation of powers gives the judiciary the last word on the rules of evidence, 
whatever the legislature tries to provide. See, e.g., State v. Larson, 453 N.W.2d 42, 46 {Minn. 
1989). 
41. H.R. 10, 104th Cong. § 102 {1995). The House passed the proposed amendment to 
Rule 702 as part of the Attorney Accountability Act of 1995. H.R. 988, 104th Cong. § 3 
{1995). The bill was introduced in the Senate but it was never considered by that body during 
the 104th Congress. In 1997, the bill was reintroduced and is currently pending in the House. 
See the Alternative Dispute Resolution and Settlement Encouragement Act, H.R. 903, 105th 
Cong. § 4 {1997). A similar, though more broadly worded, proposed amendment to Rule 702 
was introduced in the Senate and is also currently pending consideration. See Civil Justice 
Fairness Act of 1997, S. 79, 105th Cong. § 302. For an account of the proposed legislation, see 
Nancy S. Farrell, Comment, Congressional Action to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 702: A 
Mischievous Attempt to Codify Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 13 J. 
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY. 523, 543-46 {1997). 
42. See Attorney Accountability: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts and 
Intellectual Property of the Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 15 {1995) [hereinafter 
Attorney Accountability Hearings] (statement of Rep. Ramstad testifying in support of H.R. 
10). 
43. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 {1993). 
44. Congressman Ramstad remarked to the House Judiciary Subcommittee that 
H.R. 10 [Common Sense Legal Reforms Act] provides concrete steps to restore effi­
ciency, accountability and fairness to our Federal civil justice system. 
Our bill also . . .  reforms rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence so that expert 
testimony is not admissible unless based on scientifically valid reasoning. What we are 
trying to do here is merely codify the Daubert case to exclude junk science. 
Attorney Accountability Hearings, supra note 42, at 16-17. 
45. See CAL. Evw. CooE § 1107 {West 1995) (providing for the admissibility of expert 
testimony on battered women's syndrome); Mosteller, Syndromes, supra note 32, at 484-91. 
For examples of DNA statutes, see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 634.25 (West Supp. 1998) (making 
DNA analysis admissible in evidence without antecedent expert testimony that method is 
trustworthy); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 634.26 ("[S]tatistical population frequency evidence, based 
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exceptions to the hearsay rule aimed at child abusers46 and spouse 
abusers. 47 , , · 
Perhaps faith in governance by neutral procedural experts is de­
clining because of a shift in the intellectual climate. Elite rulemak­
ing teams of judges and lawyers may have become victims of the 
death of Progressivism, of the final triumph of legal realism, or of 
postmodern skepticism about objectivity.48 At another level of in­
tellectual climate, it seems likely that popular interest in improve­
ment of the trial process has been fanned by the media. Cameras in 
the courtroom and media attention to notorious trials have exposed 
evidentiary rules and practices to public view and encouraged tele­
vised debate on topics such as the admissibility of prior rape convic­
tions or the wisdom of the parent-child privilege. Other aspects of 
the political climate may also have made trial reform attractive to 
legislators; perhaps an emergent anti-statist, anti-tax consensus has 
led politicians to look harder for wrongs that can be righted without 
any budgetary consequence. 
Where the involvement of politicians and their constituents in 
the making of evidence law will lead is unclear; it need not lead to 
free proof or a more rational system. It may, however, lead away 
from rules that are of special convenience to lawyers and judges, 
on genetic or blood test results, is admissible to demonstrate the fraction of the population 
that would have the same combination of genetic markers as was found in a specific human 
biological specimen."). The Minnesota Supreme Court had a more conservative approach to 
the admissibility of DNA statistical population frequency evidence than did the Minnesota 
legislature, and that difference of opinion, coupled with the court's view that the separation 
of powers gave the court the final word on evidence law, caused a curious constitutional 
confrontation. Frustrated with the court's unwillingness to follow statutory mandates on the 
admissibility of DNA testimony, legislators prepared an amendment to the Minnesota Con­
stitution providing that DNA evidence was admissible. See David Shaffer, High-tech DNA 
Evidence Spawns Legal Showdown, State High Court Balks on Effort to Ease Rule, ST. PAUL 
PIONEER PRESs, Jan. 9, 1994, at lA. While the amendment was pending, the court capitu­
lated in State v. Bloom, 516 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1994). 
A curious California example of substantive influences on rules limiting the admission of 
scientific evidence is the "Gotch Bill," which prohibits use of evidence of live animal experi­
ments in product liability actions involving motor vehicles. See CAL. Evm. CoDE § 1159 
(West 1995). The sponsor's aim was to stop General Motors from using live animals in crash 
tests. See Ralph Frammolino, Wilson Signs Law Barring GM Animal Test Evidence, L.A. 
TIMES, July 15, 1992, at B2. 
46. See, e.g., CAL. Evm. CODE § 1228. For a discussion of statutory innovations, see 
Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine under the 
Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. !LL. L. REv. 691. 
47. See CAL. Evm. CoDE § 1370 (West Supp. 1998). This provision was enacted partly in 
response to the court's exclusion of hearsay evidence of threats, stalking, and physical abuse 
in the OJ. Simpson case. See infra note 53 and accompanying text. 
48. By the sentence in text, I mean only to suggest an intellectual climate in which faith in 
professionalism, expertise, neutral principles, and objectivity may be fading. Cf. Kenneth W. 
Graham, Jr., The Persistence of Progressive Proceduralism, 61 TEXAS L. REv. 929, 940-48 
(1983) (book review) (attacking "progressive proceduralism" from viewpoint of trials as the­
ater and political struggle rather than as effort at rational inquiry); Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., 
"There'll Always be an England": The Instrumental Ideology of Evidence, 85 MICH. L. REv. 
1204, 1220-22, 1228-34 (1987) (book review) (same). 
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and toward ones that favor victims, witnesses, or other participants. 
One might see, for example, a reduction of the power and influence 
of lawyers in a professionally dear role, that of cross-examination. 
To the extent that the rulemaking influence of lawyers and judges is 
reduced, rules like the hearsay rule and the ban on character evi­
dence are in peril. Trial lawyers are the lovers of such rules, trea­
suring their hard-won knowledge, defending their traditions, and 
valuing the dominant role that the rules give them. 
The joint effects of politicization and of substantive influences 
could become more potent if criminal rules of evidence become un­
packed from civil rules. The transubstantive nature of the rules of 
evidence and the drafting role of life-tenure judges may have given 
the rulemakers greater allegiance to a neutral-rationalist ideal, and 
lessened their concern about the impact of the rules upon particular 
constituencies.49 If the criminal and civil rules were separate codes 
drafted politically, one could easily imagine different rules for ex­
pert testimony in criminal and civil cases.50 Prosecutors might 
lobby for a more relaxed regime for experts in criminal cases, so 
that traditional forensic experts could continue to testify despite a 
shaky scientific basis,51 while manufacturers might lobby for a rigor­
ous regime in civil cases, to protect them from the depredations of 
lawyers using "junk science" to show the ill effects of products. 
CONCLUSION 
The intrinsic exclusionary rules are in peril, but only partly be­
cause of Damaska's three crumbling pillars. The rule against char­
acter evidence is likely to be influenced as much by public attitudes 
49. Cf. Paul D. Carrington, Aim of Mandatory Disclosure Was to Save Judicial 
Rulemaking, lNsIDE Lmo., May 1994, at 10, 14 ("Capitol Hill is a different kind of place 
from committee rooms of the U.S. Judicial Conference. One thing you can admire about the 
life tenure of federal judges is that it does liberate them from a sense of obligation to constit­
uencies . . . .  [T]hey are not particularly interested in whose ox is being gored by a particular 
rule."). 
50. Such a division was attempted in H.R. 988, 104th Cong. § 3 (1995), supra note 41. See 
David L. Faigman, Making the Law Safe for Science: A Proposed Rule for the Admission of 
Expert Testimony, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 401, 404 n.7 (1996) ("[T]he most outrageously political 
provision in the Bill [H.R. 988] is section ( d), which limits the rigorous review of scientific 
evidence to civil cases. Since prosecutors are the biggest consumers of science in court, it is 
not difficult to see the politics behind this provision. In effect, given the values supposedly 
behind this law, it allows prosecutors to use junk science, while civil litigants must demon­
strate valid science."). 
51. See, e.g., 2 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN ScrnNTIFic EVIDENCE 188-224 (ques­
tioning the scientific basis for talker identification); id. at 79-123 (handwriting identification). 
Cf. Michael J. Saks, What DNA "Fingerprinting" Can Teach the Law about the Rest of 
Forensic Science, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 361 (1991) (proposing that other forensic sciences be 
subject to the same scrutiny as DNA fingerprinting). The proliferation of civil and criminal 
forensic experts raises the disturbing prospect that, with the politicization in intrinsic eviden­
tiary rules, these experts will seek and acquire legislative protection from assaults on the 
admissibility of their expertise. 
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toward crime as by any change in the three pillars, though of course 
a deterioration of the pillars could weaken resistance to politically 
inspired changes in the rules. The rules limiting expert testimony 
are likely to be more affected by scientization than by changes in 
the three pillars. The exclusionary barriers may be raised in an at­
tempt to protect against "junk science" while the system readies 
itself for some of the more drastic changes that are likely to occur if 
real scientists become regularly involved. 
That leaves the hearsay rule. One might expect that an in­
creased use of unitary courts (making it harder to prevent the 
factfinder from learning the content of excluded statements) and 
the spreading out of trial proceedings (making it possible to give 
the opponent of hearsay an opportunity to seek out the declarant or 
information about the declarant) would lead to further relaxation 
of the rule. But it is unclear, at least in the United States, that jury 
trial is really abating,52 so we will have to await events to see 
whether unitary trials will dominate. Moreover, hearsay is less vul­
nerable to tinkering by reformers with substantive agendas because 
it is hard to foresee which way the hearsay rule will cut - some­
times it helps the prosecution, sometimes the defense, sometimes 
business, sometimes the consumer. Although the hearsay ban occa­
sionally attracts political attention,53 usually it is unaffected by sen­
sational trials and changes in public opinion. So trial lawyers will 
probably retain their influence over the shaping of the rule, and 
lawyers tend to support the ban on hearsay evidence.54 It enhances 
their professional role, glorifying cross-examination and increasing 
the opportunity for it. At any rate, lawyers of all stripes tend to be 
procedurally conservative,55 disfavoring any change in the rules of 
52. See supra text accompanying notes 14-19. 
53. Consider CAL. Evrn. CooE § 1370 (West Supp. 1998), inspired by the O.J. Simpson 
case. The amendment, expedited legislation that became effective before the Simpson civil 
trial, was partially a response to the exclusion of Nicole Simpson's diary entries in the crimi­
nal trial. The Senate Rules Committee Report stated that there was a "deficiency" in hearsay 
law and that the "most notable recent examples of this deficiency in California law is the 
exclusion of hearsay statements made by Nie[ Joie Brown to her diary and to others, describ­
ing threats and physical abuses by Orenthal Simpson." SENATE RULES CoMM., Senate Floor 
Bill No. AB2068: Committee Analysis (Cal. Aug. 14, 1996) available in LEXIS, Legis Li­
brary, Caco= Ftle; see also 1996 CAL. LEms. SERV. 416 (West); William Claiborne, For 
Simpson Civil Tria� New Players and New Rules: Away from TV Cameras, Defendant to be 
Compelled to Testify Before Santa Monica Jury, WASH. PoST, Sept. 16, 1996, at Al (discussing 
application of new law on hearsay evidence to Simpson civil trial); Duke Helfand, Defense 
Bid to Question Clark, Darden Rejected, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1996, at B3. 
54. On lawyers as opponents of hearsay change, see Roger Park, A Subject Matter 
Approach to Hearsay Refonn, 86 M1CH. L. REv. 51, 67-68 (1987). 
55. Bentham put it uncharitably in his continuation of the unfavorable comparison be­
tween lawyer factfinders and peasant factfinders: "The peasant wants only to be taught, the 
lawyer to be untaught: an operation painful enough, even to ordinary pride, but to pride 
exalted and hardened by power, altogether unendurable." 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE 
OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 8 (John s. Mill ed., 1827) (emphasis in original). 
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the game. The hearsay rule will be with us for a long time to come, 
perhaps as long as the adversary system itself.56 
In closing, I wish to add a heartfelt salute to Damaska's graceful 
English. He complains about being "homeless in a borrowed 
tongue" (p. x), but he writes with remarkable precision and ease. 
His use of an adopted tongue may even be an advantage, adding to 
the originality and freshness of his writing. He conveys a sense of 
fascination with the language and what it can do. His vocabulary is 
engaging and educational - I kept my dictionary at my side and 
learned several new words. The reader will enjoy his metaphors 
and allusions. He illustrates his points with satisfying concreteness. 
But most of all, he presents his ideas clearly and effectively, telling 
a story that holds together in a way that makes it hard to resist. 
56. For a remarkable instance of the emergence of an elaborate hearsay rule with dozens 
of exceptions in the context of agency determinations in unitary but adversarial proceedings, 
see Michael H. Graham, Application of the Rules of Evidence in Administrative Agency 
Formal Adversarial Adjudications: A New Approach, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 353 (describing 
United States Department of Labor evidentiary rules for formal adversarial adjudicatory 
hearings). So perhaps a relaxed hearsay rule would survive even the final demise of bifur­
cated proceedings. Concededly, as Professor Graham recognizes, many administrative agen­
cies follow more relaxed rules. Id. at 354-55. 
